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A COMMON LAW FOR THE FIRST AMENDMENT
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN*

I have chosen a title for this article that looks, in some sense,
to be innocence incarnate. On the one hand, the common law is
an ancient and mostly honorable tradition. On the other hand,
the First Amendment, with its protection of freedom of speech
and the press, is one of the bulwarks of our current constitutional order. Taken together, the positive synergies between
them should produce an intellectual structure that generates
widespread political and social appeal. Nonetheless, on this
score appearances are deceiving, and I shall try to explain the
tension in the system. In Part I, I consider the tension between a
generalized common law system of liability and the constitutional principles that underlie the First Amendment. For these
purposes, I indulge in a bit of historical oversimplification by
treating the common law as including both law and equity. I
do so in order to consider the full range of remedies from damages to injunctions as part of a unified theory. In Part II, I explain how the tension between common law and constitutional
methods results in serious breakdowns in legal doctrine. The
central point should be clear. Constitutional law does not operate in an institutional and conceptual void. The successful articulation of First Amendment doctrine depends critically on
understanding the private law rules that regulate speech and
all forms of similar conduct.
I.

THE GENERAL STATE OF PLAY BETWEEN COMMON AND
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A.

The Labor Law Analogy

The title of this essay is consciously patterned on the title of
an article that I published in the Yale Law Journal some thirty-
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four years ago—A Common Law for Labor Relations.1 That article
carried with it this subtitle—A Critique of the New Deal Labor
Legislation.2 That article was, and was meant to be, heretical. I
had received a personal invitation to attend the conference
from Eugene Illovsky, a member of the Yale chapter of the
then-nascent Federalist Society. The grandees at the Yale Law
School had allocated the society a single slot at the two-day
conference on the celebration [sic!] of the fiftieth anniversary of
the New Deal, and Illovsky wondered if I would have enough
temerity to fill it.
It was no secret that the other panelists would offer, in varying degrees, support for the New Deal enterprise. Without hesitation, I offered to pay my own airplane fare, if need be, to return to my alma mater. I wished to voice my deep
disagreements with the reigning policy on American labor law.
Labor law was a field in which I had done no systematic scholarship, but in which I had long sensed a deep, unbridgeable
chasm between my own nascent views and the conventional
wisdom on the subject, introduced to me as a student by my
own Yale Law School professor, the late Harry H. Wellington.
Wellington was an expert in legal process far more comfortable
with the New Deal synthesis than was I. So for Wellington, it
was important that the major premise—the desirability, if not
necessity of collective bargaining—was taken more or less as a
historical given. The hard work of scholarship and debate at
the time was over the proper mode of implementing the National Labor Relations Act: were its objectives best achieved
through rulemaking, through judicial decisions, by a board,
through arbitration, through private contract, or some ideal
combination of the above? I sat in the class often mumbling to
myself, “You never ask the right question, which is whether
you ought to blow up this entire system and start over.”
When I returned to the Yale Law School in 1983, I decided to
exact my revenge by defending the common law alternative to
the NLRA in a not-so-subtle effort to blow up the entire edifice.
Having done some research, my choice of the subtitle was taken, and was meant to be taken, as deeply subversive of the es1. Richard A. Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of the New
Deal Labor Legislation, 92 YALE L.J. 1357 (1983).
2. Id.
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tablished wisdom. Conceptually, my major thrust was a pointby-point defense of the common law system of labor relations.
The high point of that exposition was my then-unthinkable defense of the “yellow-dog contract,” under which a firm and
worker could agree that the worker would not join, nor agree
to join, a union so long as he continued to work for his employer.3 The choice of my subtitle was a not-so-subtle allusion to my
endorsement of a common law framework that was universally
reviled and explicitly rejected by the major labor law reform
statutes of the 1930s, including the Norris-LaGuardia Act of
19324 and the National Labor Relations Act of 1935.5
My impassioned defense of the common law system provoked a tart and indignant response from Professors Julius
Getman and Thomas Kohler. They accused me of taking a
“breathtakingly simple” approach to labor law, when a more
nuanced and incremental approach was desperately needed.6
The tenor of the reaction is evident in the following paragraph,
which I quote with reluctance because it illustrates the establishment’s resentment towards the defense of laissez-faire economics:
Professor Epstein’s work does not contribute in any way to
our existing store of knowledge about labor law. It sheds no
light on the reality of labor relations, nor does it contribute
anything to our understanding of the impact of labor law on
society. Given the antiquated nature of his methodology, it
is not surprising that Professor Epstein reiterates many of
the same propositions, syllogisms and rationalizations of
those who opposed the enactment of the NLRA and the
Norris-LaGuardia Act in the first place, and without any
newer evidence.7

Their article had its own problems. It offered no explanation
as to why or how this costly system of cartelized labor relations

3. See id. at 1370–75. The major decision in that regard was Hitchman Coal & Coke
Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229 (1917), with an opinion from the astute Justice Mahlon
Pitney, which I still regard as the textbook example of sound economic reasoning.
4. Ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (2012)).
5. Ch. 332, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2012)).
6. See Julius G. Getman & Thomas C. Kohler, The Common Law, Labor Law, and
Reality: A Response to Professor Epstein, 92 YALE L.J. 1415, 1415 (1983).
7. Id. at 1416.
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outperforms competitive markets.8 It failed to anticipate the
level of decline in union membership in the years that followed.9 It made no reference to the unprecedented improvement in human welfare in the United States that took place
during the period of 1870 to 1940 when laissez-faire synthesis
predominated10—which, as Johan Norberg chronicles, only a
program of market liberalization could duplicate worldwide.11
Their response prompted my equally pointed reply that,
while their insistence on carefully studying incremental changes is an effective way to avoid serious intellectual inquiry, it
offers no theoretical defense of the body of law that has come
under attack.12 My war cry then, and my war cry now, is that
“it takes a theory to beat a theory,”13 and defenders of modern
legislation, and modern constitutional theory, too often consider implacable outrage at older common law systems to be a
refutation of that system’s central premises.
In fact, the use of the yellow-dog contract was a wellconceived private effort by employers to preserve competitive
markets in labor.14 Competition works as well for labor as for
goods, so these contracts should be welcomed as a matter of
public policy. At the time, this point was recognized when the
unanimous 1908 Supreme Court decision in Loewe v. Lawlor15
rightly applied the antitrust prohibitions of the Sherman Act to
8. See Richard A. Epstein, The Progressives’ Deadly Embrace of Cartels: A Close Look
at Labor and Agricultural Markets, 1890–1940, in THE PROGRESSIVES’ CENTURY: POLITICAL REFORM, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT, AND THE MODERN AMERICAN
STATE 339 (Stephen Skowronek et al. eds., 2016).
9. See James Sherk, Labor Unions: Declining Membership Shows Labor Laws Need
Modernizing, HERITAGE FOUND. (Jan. 22, 2013), http://www.heritage.org/jobs-andlabor/report/labor-unions-declining-membership-shows-labor-laws-needmodernizing [https://perma.cc/D2ZA-WRYH].
10. See ROBERT J. GORDON, THE RISE AND FALL OF AMERICAN GROWTH: THE U.S.
STANDARD OF LIVING SINCE THE CIVIL WAR (2016). Gordon never, however, correlates that development with the dominant labor law regime in place at the time.
See Richard A. Epstein, The Real Cause of American Growth, DEFINING IDEAS (Hoover Institution, D.C.) (Feb. 29, 2016), http://www.hoover.org/research/real-causeamerican-growth [https://perma.cc/E2EC-BXSA].
11. See generally JOHAN NORBERG, PROGRESS: TEN REASONS TO LOOK FORWARD
TO THE FUTURE (2016).
12. See Richard A. Epstein, Common Law, Labor Law, and Reality: A Rejoinder to
Professors Getman and Kohler, 92 YALE L.J. 1435, 1435 (1983).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1437.
15. 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
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labor organizations, prompting the passage of Section 6 of the
Clayton Act after the progressive Woodrow Wilson was elected
president.16 Applying separate common law rules to labor and
goods was one sign among many of the weakness of the progressives’ position.17 There is no deep gulf that separates sound
principles for labor markets from parallel principles that work
for goods, real estate, or insurance, and a proper theoretical
framework should reflect that.
Decisions such as Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell18 and
Loewe are consistent with a general theory of social welfare. The
initial move of the common law can be simply stated: contract
is good but coercion is bad. The explanation of this starting
point is simple enough. Contracts improve the lot of both parties, and in general improve the opportunities of all third parties. Coercion restricts individual choices and thus produces
losses that exceed the gains. Coercion also negatively affects
third parties by hobbling or removing potential trading partners. There are of course both complications with, and limitations on these rules, most of which I cannot discuss here. But
the critical move is to constrain contracts between people to use
force against third parties, for these agreements are deeply
subversive of social welfare. It is not enough to make these contracts unenforceable because informal norms allow them an
extended time in which to wreak destruction. The synergistic
gains from cooperation increase the likelihood of negative externalities if third persons will be subject to violence or forced
to enter into transactions against their will. It is precisely because the negative externalities are so large that we develop a

16. See Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 6, 38 Stat. 730, 731–32 (1914) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 17 (2012)):
The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce.
Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the
existence and operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural
organizations, instituted for the purposes of mutual help, and not having
capital stock or conducted for profit, or to forbid or restrain individual
members of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate
objects thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the members thereof, be
held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of
trade, under the antitrust laws.
17. For a longer discussion, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, HOW PROGRESSIVES REWROTE THE CONSTITUTION 89–99 (2006).
18. 245 U.S. 229 (1917).
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body of law that punishes conspiracies to rob banks or kill innocent persons.
The dangers of conspiracy spill over, albeit less dramatically,
into monopoly situations where parties enter into contracts in
restraint of trade whereby they hope to become a single supplier of goods or services—the major target of the Sherman Act of
1890.19 It is a well-established practice that a single supplier of
key goods and services, as with public utilities and common
carriers, is required to serve its customers on fair, reasonable,
and nondiscriminatory terms.20 The logic here is that breaking
up these corporations is not feasible because the single supplier
can serve the market more cheaply than multiple suppliers,
given the need for heavy front-end investment.21 So the nextbest alternative is a cautious regime of price regulation, with an
effort to bring those prices down to competitive levels. Socially,
it is too costly to allow any party to refuse to deal with customers who have no market alternatives: the holdout position is
just too strong.22
This obligation to serve does not extend to competitive markets, including labor markets. In these settings there is no
forced business, and therefore the earlier decisions of Adair v.
United States23 and Coppage v. Kansas24—striking down the collective bargaining statute—were not, pace Getman and Kohler,
some ancient curiosities. Rather, they presented the sound approach. Then, in basic market settings, the traditional tort of
19. Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209, 209–10 (1890) (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012)).
20. See, e.g., Anne Layne-Farrar, A. Jorge Padilla & Richard Schmalensee, Pricing
Patents for Licensing in Standard-Setting Organizations: Making Sense of Frand Commitments, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 671 (2007). The rules here are a carryover from those
that start with rate of return regulation for public utilities. See generally Duquesne
Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299 (1989).
21. For a classic exposition, see Harold Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, 11 J.L.
& ECON. 55 (1968); see also Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation,
21 STAN. L. REV. 548 (1969).
22. This issue is one that has kept me occupied for years. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, PRINCIPLES FOR A FREE SOCIETY: RECONCILING INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY WITH
THE COMMON GOOD, 279–318 (1998); Richard A. Epstein, Hayek’s Constitution of
Liberty—A Guarded Retrospective, REV. OF AUSTRIAN ECON. (2016); Richard A. Epstein, The History of Public Utility Rate Regulation in the United States Supreme Court:
Of Reasonable and Nondiscriminatory Rates, 38 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 345 (2013).
23. 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
24. 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (like Hitchman, written by Justice Pitney).
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inducement to breach of contract is a counterweight to union
power that helps preserve competitive bargaining on both
sides of the market. Hence the case for the yellow-dog contract
alluded to above: if you ask workers on a job who are not union members to come out in unison when called, it’s inducement to breach of contract, which is tortious, and you can enjoin them and hold them responsible. All of this makes
economic sense: the employer gets stability and the workers get
protection against both work instability and union pressures to
covertly join their ranks. Damning these contracts has become
an article of faith for a church from which only a few people,
like myself, decline membership, both today and during the
New Deal period between 1932 and 1940. But, if my view is
right, the National Labor Relations Act, the Norris-LaGuardia
Act, and the Fair Labor Standards Act, which regulates minimum wage and overtime,25 should go the way of all flesh. They
have to be rejected on political grounds, and in my view should
struck down on constitutional grounds as well, as in Adair and
Coppage.
B.

Free Speech Without the First Amendment

This lengthy and ominous introduction relates very closely
to my chosen topic, for the same approach of working off the
common law rules yields large dividends in understanding
what is right, and all too often, wrong in modern American
First Amendment law. The current law is often quite confused.
Sometimes it does not extend its protection far enough but,
sadly, in too many contexts it cuts too wide a swath. The remarks that follow are designed to expose its endemic weaknesses.
The key analytical starting point is that the common law
does not relegate speech to one box and conduct to another.
Thus the discussion of these labor law cases has to address the
question of what kinds of human activities, broadly conceived,
should be regarded as tortious. One is inducement of breach of
contract, already encountered in connection with the yellowdog contract in labor markets and applicable everywhere else
in principle. Well, inducement almost always involves speech,
25. Fair Labor Standards Act, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060, 1060 (1938) (codified at 29
U.S.C. § 201, et seq. (2007)).
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or at least pantomime. So the key question is, if it involves
speech, why is it not protected by the First Amendment, with
its categorical statement that Congress shall make no law
abridging the freedom of speech? Consider also the common
carrier who refuses to deal with a customer. Is that spoken or
written refusal protected by the First Amendment against government regulation? Conversely, where there is no monopoly
power, the refusal to deal offends no common law principle.
How then is it possible for the state, consistent with principles
of free speech, to say that expressing a refusal to deal is not
protected under the First Amendment?
These are not idle questions, and at the very least, they raise
the following puzzle. Aren’t matters exactly backwards if
speech that is tortious at common law turns out to be protected
under the Constitution, and speech that is protected at common law turns out to be punishable under those pesky, but alltoo constitutional, New Deal statutes? Just asking that question
should demonstrate that the juridical shift from the older system of common law entitlements to the newer system of labor
relations is no mere marginal adjustment in the evolution of the
law, but a fundamental inversion of basic relationships. It’s like
taking a ship that has been sailing due north, and turning it
around so that it now sails due south, saying all the while, “We
haven’t done anything except a modest course correction.”
Thus, one ought to rethink the analysis of any topic relating
to freedom of speech that separates speech from all other forms
of human conduct. That approach should caution you to scrutinize any claim that affirmatively differentiates between pure
expression, pure conduct, or, like billboards and signs, some
mixture between the two. Why worry about these classifications as a matter of constitutional law if they don’t work as a
matter of common law theory?
But why worry about the common law? For its internal coherence and good sense. The set of common law rules should
not be understood as some arbitrary assemblage of rules, but as
a comprehensive world-view that seeks, however haltingly, to
understand the proper spheres for cooperation and coercion in
diverse settings. Put otherwise, common law is not just a process for incremental decision-making. It is also a deep normative commitment to the basic rules of property, contract, tort,
and restitution. Efforts like that of my Chicago colleague, Da-
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vid Strauss, to keep the process and junk the substantive commitments give far too much leeway to the directionless actions
of judges and legislators in every area of law.26
Against this backdrop, one must develop a deep and permanent skepticism toward attributing fundamental significance to
classifications that don’t work. So long as speech can be innocent or tortious, and conduct can be innocent or tortious, the
real task is to discern which speech and which conduct fall into
which category, and why. That is ultimately a social inquiry
that asks whether protecting particular forms of speech or conduct optimizes social gains. Speech that moves social behavior
toward competition meets that test, and that which facilitates
monopoly does not. One cannot put both pro-competitive and
anti-competitive speech into the same box, when they have opposite social consequences. The theoretical gulf between these
two forms of speech cannot be papered over.
At this point we can see the built-in advantage that the
common law enjoys over a constitutional analysis that tries to
compartmentalize and separate all speech and all conduct. The
common law’s goal was to protect voluntary transactions in (as
it turns out) competitive markets, and to stop coercion in the
other. As we look at that question once again, the supposed
line between speech and conduct breaks down.
It is helpful to define coercion. The obvious case is the use of
force. Common wisdom suggests that force is not speech, but
this is oversimplified, for coercion also involves the threat of the
use of force. No matter how clever you are with words, you
cannot come up with a credible argument that threats are not a
form of speech. You might insist that certain bodily movements
are not speech, but even that is an idle gesture. Where there is a
desire to protect benevolent forms of speech, no one argues
that pantomime is not protected because no words are spoken.
Indeed, the inexorable doctrinal move from freedom of speech
to freedom of expression is a silent tribute to the view that
speech under the Constitution must encompass more than
speech. But the intellectual move that words includes expression cannot ignore bad expressions either. Both words and ex26. See David A. Strauss, The Living Constitution, U. CHI. L. SCH. REC., Fall 2010,
at 8, http://www.law.uchicago.edu/news/living-constitution [https://perma.cc/
93YA-CTXD]; see also Richard A. Epstein, Linguistic Relativism and the Decline of the
Rule of Law, 39 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y. 583, 593–99 (2016).
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pressions are speech, and both warrant parallel treatments.
Matters don’t get any easier when we return to the problem of
the common carrier who lacks the luxury of the refusal to deal.
He does not threaten force against others, but his general monopoly power has long created the general duty to serve, as
noted above.
We have seen that there is no fundamental distinction between conduct, on the one hand, and speech, on the other, both
normatively and positively as a matter of common law. The
next question concerns which forms of conduct are protected,
and which are not. Let’s begin with a very naive premise—that
generally speaking, people know their own self-interest. And
so, if they decide to do a particular action, the reason we favor
freedom for them—that is, all of them—is we now know that
somebody is better off, and we don’t have any information as
to whether or not, either episodically or systematically, anybody else is worse off. So there is a Pareto improvement under
the familiar definition. Generally speaking, the older I get, the
harder it is to find some supposedly free-standing moral objection to a move from some initial state of nature that works a
Pareto improvement. Who should hold that trump card, and of
what does it consist? There are all sorts of reasons to think that
simple egoism is indefensible because it implies that I don’t
care what happens to anyone else so long as I am better off. A
rule of that sort, generally applied, leads to social conflict and
worse. I have not seen anyone construct a credible moral theory for the unvarnished moral claim that a rule that works to the
advantage of all is for some unspecified reason unacceptable. It
is perfectly permissible to say that what one person wants
could be morally impermissible because of its effect on other
parties. But if everyone shares the same view that externality
problem disappears.
The reason that I speak of this as a presumption is that we
must reject it in some circumstances to forestall the possibility
of anarchy. That point was expressed in the older language of
political theory by drawing a distinction between liberty and
license, where the former is keenly aware of possible externali-

No. 1]

Common Law for the First Amendment

11

ties on third persons, which the latter systematically ignores.27
Now these externalities are of two sorts. There are some that
are positive, which are extremely important but tend to be ignored in legal analysis because they usually don’t result in legal action. The few but important exceptions arise in cases of
unjust enrichment where someone provides direct assistance to
another person, by protecting person or property when that
person cannot protect himself. I shall talk about these somewhat, but for the moment it is sufficient to observe that in legal
and political theory the first order of business is not to subsidize positive externalities. Instead, it is to make sure that negative externalities, properly defined, will be effectively controlled so that mass mayhem does not upset the peace and
good order of society.
Thus the libertarian says, and says rightly, that the use or
threat of force is not a part of any system of protected liberty,
because, if systematically engaged in by all persons against all
other persons, it would lead to the war of all against all, in
which nobody is better off. This is not a very difficult empirical
judgment, either before or after Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan.28
And so what you must do is to find a way to yoke together certain forms of speech and other conduct that can then either be
equally permitted or prescribed under some general formula.
Now the libertarian recognizes that force has a kid brother,
which turns out to be some form of misrepresentation. We talk
about force and fraud. There is a nice relationship between
fraud and (innocent) misrepresentation, in which the statement
is not known to be false to the person who makes it. The latter
has the capacity to hurt, but generally carries a different valence for two reasons. First, people who make innocent misrepresentations often try to correct them, and second, these misstatements, being less purposive, usually carry less serious
consequences. So if we concentrate on fraud, we get most of the
universe except perhaps in such recondite areas as security registration statements, where liability tends to rest on negligence

27. See, e.g., Alexander Rosenthal-Pubúl, Reflections on Ancient and Modern Freedom, MODERN AGE, Winter 2016, at 35, https://home.isi.org/sites/default/files/MA_
58.1_Rosenthal-Pubul_Web.pdf [https://perma.cc/4VLR-67TE].
28. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (J.C.A. Gaskin ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1996)
(1651).
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in England29 and on strict liability in the United States.30 Once
again, no great genius could credibly claim that fraudulent
speech or fraudulent conduct should be regarded as something
other than speech. Yet nobody would want to defend the propriety of fraudulent behavior as a matter of course, even
though there are many times where lying may be perfectly justified, as in self-defense, or to preserve privacy against a snoop.
Of course, lying is less risky than menacing behavior because it
is easier to walk away from the former than the latter so that all
lies do not achieve their objective, given the relative ease of
self-help. You can lie to someone, and it is his reaction that determines whether you have deceived that person, by establishing the needed causal link based on some combination of materiality31 and reliance.32 But when the deceit works, it can be
deadly, such as when it leads someone to eat poisonous food or
walk into a hidden trap.
Those lies turn out to be even more dangerous, even deadly
in the context of defamation, where A states a falsehood to B
about the position of C. If I lie to the king and he executes the
person on the strength of my representations, defamation kills.
And while the king may check out the story, he is unlikely to
exercise as much care in the defense of C as he will of himself.
In more prosaic situations, a false statement to a business person could lead him or her to refuse to conduct business with a
third person. That loss of a business opportunity or a social association can have very large consequences, which is why defamation has always been actionable as a species of interference
with advantageous relationships.33 It is also worth noting that
the deliberate use of force against a third party can achieve
similar results with even more powerful effects, as exemplified
by the famous example of the schoolmaster who frightens
away his pupils by shooting at them when on the way to a

29. See, for the English experience, Directors Liability Act, 1890, 7 CAPE L.J. 253
(1890), which expanded liability to a negligence standard after Derry v. Peek (1889)
14 App. Cas. 336 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.).
30. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2012).
31. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
32. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
33. See id. § 559.
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competitor’s school.34 There was no force against the rival
schoolmaster, but the pupils found it prudent to stay away at
low cost, ruining the rival schoolmaster’s business through the
loss of his customers. So it is no wonder that in dealing with
these interference cases, force and fraud tend to be substitutes
for each other, where the former is more potent, but the latter
more common.
It is here, moreover, that we start to see cases where the extensive protection of the First Amendment understates the
risks of misrepresentation. The older common law accommodation held that political figures could bring actions for false
statements of fact, even if statements of opinion were absolutely protected.35 But how to draw the line between them? The
best response is that a given statement, say that X is a thief,
looks like a statement of fact if made as a bald assertion. But
the position changes once the speaker outlines, truthfully, the
facts on which those allegations are based, so that the audience
can judge for itself the truth behind the inflammatory allegation.36 Unfortunately today, false statements of fact, often with
devastating consequences, are only actionable with proof of
actual malice, that is, knowledge of the statement’s falsity or
reckless indifference to its truthfulness.37 That rule was introduced in New York Times v. Sullivan38 to spare the Times from a
set of outrageous jury verdicts in Alabama that could have
bankrupted the paper. But that Alabama judgment was deficient on so many grounds—its wild-high estimate of general
damages was ludicrous, for example—that there was no need
34. For an account, see Keeble v. Hickeringill (1706) 103 Eng. Rep. 1127 (KB), dealing with the Schoolmasters’ case decided in the reign of Henry IV. Note that Lord
Holt drew the correct distinction between competition and the use of force:
This is like the case of 11 H. 4, 47. One schoolmaster sets up a new school
to the damage of an ancient school, and thereby the scholars are allured
from the old school to come to his new. (The action there was held not to
lie.) But suppose Mr. Hickeringill should lie in the way with his guns,
and fright the boys from going to school, and their parents would not let
them go thither; sure that schoolmaster might have an action for the loss
of his scholars.
Id. at 1128; see also Tarleton v. M’Gawley (1793) 170 Eng. Rep. 153 (KB).
35. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 267 (1964).
36. For the best exposition, see Van Vechten Veeder, Freedom of Public Discussion,
23 HARV. L. REV. 413, 419–20 (1910).
37. N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279–80.
38. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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to remove an essential protection for reputation in typical cases
that do not come up through a segregationist system in the old
South.39 It is not that the common law offers no protection for
the freedom of speech. Rather, the best way to look at the constitutional dimension is to say that the First Amendment prevents the contraction of the common law protections, but does
not require their systematic expansion. The loss of the correlative rights has poor consequences of its own, by making individuals less likely to participate in politics if they can be exposed to that form of abuse without adequate means of legal
remedy in the case of serious defamation in cases when counterspeech cannot be invoked in time: think of the candidate for
public office who is defamed on the eve of an election. Counterspeech the next day will not change the vote. A damage
remedy might deter the conduct. The protection of reputation
therefore also advances the free and robust debate that New
York Times sought to protect.
By putting these pieces together, it is possible to determine
which kinds of behaviors are worthy of protection and which
are not, without invoking any kind of general constitutional
doctrine. But it turns out that the constitutional mistake in New
York Times is replicated in other areas as well. It is useful to
play out this theme with several further examples.
The model that I have developed thus far has omitted very
important issues that must be brought back into the equation.
Sometimes using force or fraud is justified under the circumstances. Now there are people who want to deny this, one of
the most famous illustrations coming from Immanuel Kant,
which basically relegates him on this point to the class of “insane philosophers on a bad day.” The famous example arises if
an intruder into your house asks the whereabouts of your children so that he can murder them. You may, Kant opines, remain silent, but you may not lie in order to throw him off the
scent.40 What an odd use of the distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance! That venerable line has no traction here
because the law of misrepresentation treats lies, concealment,
39. See Richard A. Epstein, Was New York Times v. Sullivan Wrong?, 53 U. CHI.
L. REV. 782 (1986).
40. Immanuel Kant, On a Supposed Right to Lie Because of Philanthropic Concerns,
reprinted in GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 63, 63 (James W. Ellington trans., Hackett Publ’g Co. 3d ed. 1993) (1785).
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and disclosures as part of a uniform system, and finds many
cases where disclosure is appropriate as a prelude to a market
transaction.41 The misfeasance rule gains traction only in cases
that deal with the asserted duty to rescue strangers, which has
traditionally been denied at common law.42 In practice, the issue in Good Samaritan cases is usually one of rash rescues
leading to death or serious injuries.43 The distinction has no
place in dealing with verbal interactions with people, where an
omission can often arise from a duty to speak—a point that is
lost in the Kantian account of lying.
This odd position on the status of justifications is supposed
to follow from the Kantian categorical imperative, binding on
all sentient beings out of some “absolute necessity” that is said
to follow from Kant’s conception of pure reason.44 This mindset
seems to have some appeal among modern philosophers, who
recoil from the difficulty of the stated example, but who nonetheless limit the kinds of maneuvers that people can use to
weave a web of deceit to throw the murderer off the track.45
The concern is that excessive duplicity interferes with the system of trust that honest communication requires.46 But that intermediate position shares, albeit in reduced form, the same
vice as the Kantian view, tolerating at least some cases in which
the killings take place when the allowable ruses have not
worked. Of course, trust is critical in relationships of confidence, for example, in such matters as medical information,
trade secrets and national security. But the appropriate steps in
these areas are not impaired in the slightest by taking maximum resistance to guard against the harms by potential thieves
and murderers. Nothing in moral theory or under the First
41. See, e.g., Laidlaw v. Organ, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 178 (1817).
42. See, e.g., Buch v. Amory Mfg. Co., 44 A. 809 (N.H. 1898).
43. See, e.g., Wagner v. Int’l Ry. Co., 133 N.E. 437 (N.Y. 1921). The futile effort of
the plaintiff to rescue his cousin, already dead, was justified by the famous phrase
“Danger invites rescue.” Id. But the rescue was already being undertaken by the
conductor and his staff, so that the plaintiff’s needless intervention put both himself and everyone else at risk. Id. at 438. The danger of futile rescues really matters, given the large number of deaths and injuries that follow. See David A. Hyman, Rescue Without Law: An Empirical Perspective on the Duty to Rescue, 84 TEX. L.
REV. 653, 712 (2006).
44. KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 40, at 2.
45. See SEANA VALENTINE SHIFFRIN, SPEECH MATTERS: ON LYING, MORALITY
AND THE LAW 5–46 (2014).
46. Id. at 46.
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Amendment blocks or hampers these efforts to counter fraudulent schemes or practices. Half measures will not do.
The carryover between public and private law runs as follows: think of the substantive guarantees of the Constitution as
creating a set of prima facie cases—prima facie you’re allowed
to talk—and then you can overcome that by showing force or
fraud, followed by the allowance for justifications. And it turns
out, even the most ardent textualist will only be able to make
sense of the substantive issues by introducing these exceptions,
often under the rubric of the police power to make the system
cohere, long a major topic of constitutional adjudication, although the words appear nowhere in the document.47 And Justices like the late Justice Antonin Scalia, wary of implication
within their originalist framework, will commonly make serious mistakes in putting the pieces together, as was surely the
case with Justice Scalia’s takings decisions.48 Sooner or later,
probably sooner, the issue of how you introduce justifications
and tease out their implications is going to be a central part of
your overall system, which means that textualism properly understood is a constitutional norm that answers a few questions
directly, and then commands you to develop a comprehensive
theory of liability, excuses, and justification.49 If you’re a good
common-law pleader, you know that confession and avoidance
do not exhaust all possibilities, which is also the case with the
police power. There are replies to these defenses and further
pleas down the road.50 By the time you’re done, there are
strong parallels between the short texts of ancient law and the
modern constitution. Thus, the simple command of the lex Aquilia—that one not kill unlawfully the slave or herd animal of
another person—generates a hugely sophisticated account of
tort law that deals with hard problems of causation, consent,
47. See generally THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION (Little, Brown, & Co. 7th ed. 1903); ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (1904); CHRISTOPHER G.
TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF POLICE POWER IN THE UNITED
STATES (1886).

48. See Richard A. Epstein, Missed Opportunities, Good Intentions: The Takings
Decisions of Justice Antonin Scalia, 6 BRIT. J. AM. LEGAL STUD. 109 (2017).
49. See Epstein, supra note 26.
50. See Richard A. Epstein, Pleadings and Presumptions, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 556
(1973).
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self-defense, necessity, and much more.51 As I have long
stressed, constitutional interpretation follows exactly the same
logic. The differences between Latin and English, between
Rome and America, and between then and now play virtually
no role in any side by side comparison of the Roman text with
the Constitution.52 But the element of surprise should be reduced when it is recalled that the notion of a constitutional republic begins with Rome, and many of our constitutional
terms, for example senator and republic, are direct takeovers
from the Latin.53 Historical myopia is dangerous intellectual
business. Nothing is more dangerous than seeking to understand constitutional law of the First Amendment or indeed anything else, within this type of historical void.
At this juncture, we need to push ahead a little bit further
and say, what else is there about common law that must be addressed after going through the prima facie case justifications
and exceptions? The answer is that it is critical to understand
how the law of remedies fits into the overall analysis. Good libertarians tend to start their analysis in the ex post world where
a single discrete causal action has taken place that links together two parties. The only question they like to address is rectification for past harms, under the model Aristotle put forward in
abbreviated form in the Nicomachean Ethics.54
Aristotle’s analysis is in many ways the starting point for serious discussions of legal rights and duties. It accomplishes two
major points. First, it insists that the link between the two parties is the trigger for any remedy between the two parties.55 Second, it holds that the actions themselves, not the general merit
or demerit of the parties, determines their rights and duties. A
good man can be liable for harm inflicted on the bad man, as

51. See DIG. 9.2.2 (Gaius, Ad Edictum Provinciale 7).
52. See generally Richard A. Epstein, A Common Lawyer Looks at Constitutional
Interpretation, 72 B.U. L. REV. 699 (1992).
53. Id. at 705.
54. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. V, at 126 (R.W. Browne trans., 1853)
(1132a2–6) (“[I]t matters not whether a good man has robbed a bad man, or a bad
man a good man, nor whether a good or bad man has committed adultery; the
law looks to the difference of the hurt alone, and treats persons, if one commits
and the other suffers injury, as equal, and also if one has done and the other suffered hurt.”).
55. Id.
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well as the reverse.56 But beyond that, Aristotle’s account is
skimpy on issues of liability. There is no discussion of the basis
of liability—strict liability, negligence and intentional harms—
and their interaction. And the issue of defense receives no systematic treatment.57 The Roman law addressed both deficiencies.58 These issues must be fleshed out, and in my view the
general relationship between strangers is one of strict liability,
subject to affirmative defenses typically based on either the
plaintiff’s own conduct or the assumption of the risk of loss.59
That strict rendition maps well into explicit constitutional
guarantees. The First Amendment speaks about abridging
freedom of speech, and does not require that the limitations be
intentional, even though in most cases they are. The question of
defense is always brought back into the law through the discussion of police power justifications for the abridgment of these rights based on the famous quartet of health, safety, morals,
and the general welfare, each of which requires extensive separate analysis.
There is also a second serious difficulty with legal analysis
that is endemic to all legal systems—namely, how to deal with
the difficult problem of uncertainty. It is very commonplace for
people to engage in actions that may or may not turn out to be
harmful, and the law must decide whether to supply an ex ante
remedy, an ex post remedy or, as is commonly the case, some
combination.
The choice among ex ante remedies is exceedingly complicated. They have a temporal component to them; just how far
back does the law go before it intervenes? In physical injury
cases, the common law tended to wait until harm was actual or
imminent before injunctive relief was supplied.60 First
Amendment cases rightly follow that view, so that early censorship is not used except where profound interests of national

56. Id.
57. See id.
58. See Epstein, supra note 52, at 706–12.
59. Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973);
Richard A. Epstein, Defenses and Subsequent Pleas in a System of Strict Liability, 3 J.
LEGAL STUD. 165 (1974).
60. See, e.g., Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101–02 (1983).
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security are at stake.61 But timing is not the only issue. Injunctions could have conditions attached, or the rules could be
crafted so as to minimize their effects on third parties.62 They
are also subject to revision on the basis of new information.63
The ex post world of damages has its own set of complications. There is no unique measure of damages within a corrective justice system. Putting the injured person back in the position that she occupied before the wrong occurred is impossible
in death cases, and often unwise in cases of serious injury like
quadriplegia, where no amount of money achieves the objective of restorative justice, and excessive payments could rob the
defendant of resources needed to conduct essential life-saving
activities. The public law faces the same question as to how to
calculate the fines applicable to different sorts of violations—
and this must be answered. But you can stare at the constitutional text as long as you want, and you will discover not a
word in it that explicitly addresses these remedial issues. As
good First Amendment lawyers, we start hearing that you do
not allow prior restraint, except in the few cases when you do.
So you have to figure out why the presumption is set one way
rather than the other, and what is needed to overcome it.
This exercise follows the same standards as those developed
by courts of equity centuries ago. In the exercise of their inherent discretion, they often delayed injunctions knowing that
people took needed precautions, and damages and injunctions
are available down the line. The error costs of moving too soon
are high, because an injunction could turn out to stop too much
activity that turns out to be innocent. One early manifestation
of this tendency is found in the old English case of Turberville v.
Savage,64 in which the plaintiff said, “If it were not assize-time
[that is, if the judge were not in town], I would not take such
language from you.”65 The court held that the words, “if it were
not assize time,” did not constitute an assault, given the absence of an intention to commit the assault. Hence the defend61. See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (no injunction
against release of Pentagon papers).
62. THOMAS CARL SPELLING, 2 A TREATISE ON INJUNCTIONS AND OTHER EXTRAORDINARY REMEDIES § 1032 (2d ed. 1901).
63. Id. § 1033.
64. (1663) 86 Eng. Rep. 684 (KB).
65. Id. at 684.
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ant could not interpose the assault of the plaintiff as a defense.
But if in fact the blow were struck, the words would no longer
matter, and the self-defense privilege would have then been
activated.
That case is a stripped-down protocol of modern cases like
Schenck v. United States,66 Abrams v. United States,67 and Dennis v.
United States,68 in which the stakes are obviously raised because
of the uncertain prospect of the violent overthrow of the United
States. But even though the stakes are vastly higher, the correct
analytical techniques are the same as those used to deal with
simple assault. Ex ante relief cannot be ruled out, but there are
serious issues as to how early in the cycle that intervention
takes place, and the choice of remedy once some intervention is
justified. And to add to the mix, charges of aiding and abetting
or conspiracy are also appropriate for crimes that deal with
speech as much as with anything else. The impassioned views
of Justice Brandeis in Whitney v. California69 about the dangers
of government overregulation of speech were not part of some
passionate attack on government misbehavior. Rather, they
were delivered in a concurrence that upheld the conviction for
conspiracy, while warning against pushing the envelope too far
outward.70 But what makes this area so difficult is that it is often easy to state the choices, but difficult to pick the right damages.71 The standard used for remedies in all contexts is the unavoidable test that relies on the “sound discretion of the trial
judge,” subject to the usual forms of judicial review.72 How that
discretion should be exercised, and what standard of review is
appropriate are the kinds of questions in which errors of overand under-intervention must be simultaneously addressed,
which is why empirically it is sometimes difficult for people
who agree on an analytical framework to reach a consensus on

66. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
67. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
68. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
69. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
70. See id. at 379 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
71. Richard A. Epstein, The Fundamentals of Freedom of Speech, 10 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 53, 57–58 (1987).
72. Richard A. Epstein, Judicial Review: Reckoning on Two Kinds of Error, 4 CATO J.
711, 717 (1985).
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the facts of any given case.73 Needless to say, the fact-specific
nature of each determination makes it hard to develop per se
rules that can confidently guide the extension of the basic rule
from one case to the next. The choice of remedies in national
security cases74—what kinds of wiretaps and surveillance tools
are permissible—is but a modern manifestation of an age-old
problem.
The moral should by now be clear. The same kinds of interpretive commitments that are required to make sense of our
constitutional guarantees are identical to those used in ordinary private law disputes. As in private law disputes, the more
complicated the case, the more contested the remedial choices.
And so, the logic of the argument shows that the higher stakes
of constitutional litigation can easily put judges squarely into
the unhappy position where they have to exercise their sound
discretion on remedial issues.
This situation is, to say the least troublesome, especially for
someone who wrote a book with the title Simple Rules for a
Complex World.75 But it is also unavoidable for this reason: it is
easy to know what to do when everyone abides by the rules of
the road. So the great office of the positive law is to lay out that
map, which then reduces the likelihood that people will go
astray. But once they deviate off the main road, it is not possible to catalogue in advance all the subsequent moves that other
parties will, or should, make in response to the initial mistake
in unanticipated ways.
C.

Sound Discretion and the Rule of Law

The harder question is whether the use of discretion at the
remedial level is in some sense fatal to the rule of law. The answer to that question is a confident no. Before getting worried
73. See Martha S. Davis, Standards of Review: Judicial Review of Discretionary Decisionmaking, 2 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 47, 49 (2000); see also Charles H. Koch, Jr.,
Judicial Review of Administrative Discretion, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 469, 470 (1986).
74. Richard A. Epstein, Let’s Not Kill All The Lawyers, FORBES (Mar. 16, 2010),
https://www.forbes.com/2010/03/15/al-qaeda-lawyers-combat-opinionscolumnists-richard-a-epstein.html [https://perma.cc/Q9HK-PQCR]; see also Richard A. Epstein, Security, Uncertainty, and the National Security Administration: The
President Should Defend, Not Revise, Current NSA Procedures, JUST SECURITY (Jan. 28,
2014, 10:35 AM), https://www.justsecurity.org/6424/guest-post-richard-epstein/
[https://perma.cc/YZ54-8Q3T].
75. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD (1995).
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by complex doctrinal variations, the first question you must
always ask is: what is the real-world frequency of occurrence of
the difficult hypotheticals that judges and law professors raise
in the abstract? In one of my Eureka moments in law school, I
was sitting in a class on civil procedure taught by the late Fleming James,76 who doubled as a distinguished tort professor.77 I
had just finished my English education, reading all of the variations on causation across the entire range of tort law that
H.L.A. Hart and Tony Honoré had discussed in their masterpiece Causation in the Law.78 Much of that subtlety was lost on
James, an old railroad lawyer, who had this to say about the
doctrine of proximate cause: “Do you know what this stuff is
about? Somebody (usually a train) ramming into somebody
else.” And he then said “pow,” as he struck his right fist into
his left palm. His point was that most of these cases are collision cases for which it is necessary to know who hit whom and
who had the right of way. 79 That test works especially well
with trains. If ninety-eight percent of the cases turn out to be
like that, any worry about the difficulties of causation and the
duty of care in cases like Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad,80 addressing as it did the unintended consequences of knocking an
unmarked package of explosives from the arms of a boarding
passenger, will have little consequence of the day-to-day operation of the law.
Indeed, as an instructive aside, cases of far-higher salience
often have little effect. When I worked as a consultant to the
76. See FLEMING JAMES, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE (1965).
77. See FOWLER V. HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS (1956).
78. H.L.A. HART & A.M. HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW (1959). At the time
the book was the best treatment of the subject. By the time of the second edition in
1985, it no longer held pride of place in large measure because it did not take into
account systematic work with the probabilistic nature of causation in many toxic
torts, malpractice, and products liability cases.
79. For the empirical observation in the same direction, see H. LAURENCE ROSS,
SETTLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE CLAIMS ADJUSTMENT
98 (2d ed. 1980):
Taking the doctrine of negligence per se to an extreme doubtless
unforeseen by the makers of the formal law, adjusters tend to define a
claim as one of liability or of no liability depending only on whether a
rule was violated, regardless of intention, knowledge, necessity, and
other such qualifications that might receive sympathetic attention even
from a traffic court judge. Such a determination is far easier than the task
proposed in theory by the formal law of negligence.
80. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
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American Insurance Association in the 1970s on product liability tort reform, everyone knew the concurring opinion of Justice Roger Traynor in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.,81 urging
strict liability instead of a negligence rule aided by the use of
res ipsa loquitur, had no effect whatsoever on insurance rates.
The exposure for liability under the two theories differed only
marginally, and the presence of a strong defense was “defined
in terms of the safety of the product in normal and proper use,
and should not extend to injuries that cannot be traced to the
product as it reached the market.”82 It was only when the basic
rules of the game were changed—so that the defendant could
still be held responsible for harms caused by altered products
that had been used improperly by a plaintiff well aware of the
danger—that the field expanded wildly. But when I was first
engaged to work on tort reform by the American Insurance Association, its key officials were keenly aware of the huge bump
in payouts that drove a huge increase in premiums. They
sensed that it was not attributable to the Restatement (Second)
of Torts adopted in 1965, even with its expanded strict liability
provision in Section 402A.83
So, there is a lesson to be learned here: if the basic structure is
sound, the countless low-frequency variations are not institutional issues, but are of concern primarily to litigators only. But
if the complexity displaces the simple rules in the ninety-eight
percent of ordinary cases, the social consequences can be dramatic, as with both the explosion of tort liability in medical
malpractice and products liability cases in the late 1960s and
1970s.84 Thus, traffic rules are the dominant constraint in highway accidents; but with medical malpractice, the decline of
custom as setting the standard of care ushered in a new age of
liability.85 It was no accident that physicians and hospitals living with the old malpractice rules, then tried to contract out of
these rules, only to be slapped down by courts heavily influ81. 150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
82. Id. at 444.
83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
84. Richard A. Epstein, Plaintiff’s Conduct in Products Liability Actions: Comparative Negligence, Automatic Division and Multiple Parties, 45 J. AIR L. & COM. 87, 115–
16 (1979).
85. See Richard A. Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The Case for Contract, 1 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 87, 95 (1976).
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enced by beliefs that these novel institutional contracts were
suspect contracts of adhesion.86 Similarly, with products liability, tort liability expanded when the courts began rejecting the
older, and superior, paradigm that liability only attached to
products that contained latent defects in their original form
that manifested itself after normal and proper use.87 Once
again, efforts to contract out of the new rules were stoutly resisted by courts, so that tort law locked everyone into a vastly
inferior set of rules.88 These differences are not small, but are
literally differences in orders of magnitude.
II.

FIRST AMENDMENT CASES—AT LAST

At this point, I shall move from the abstract to the concrete
by discussing an important set of cases that look at both sides
of the coin: those in which the Supreme Court has followed, to
good effect, established common law principles, and those in
which the Supreme Court has, to bad effect, deviated from
those principles.
A.

Good Speech Doctrine

First, I will discuss those areas where the Court has been successfully guided by common law principles: offensive speech
and truthful speech.
1.

Offensive Speech

On the former point, let me mention just two doctrines that
resonate. The first is the view taken in cases such as Texas v.
Johnson,89 in which the Court held that the offense that the public at large takes to flag burning does not justify banning this
vivid form of expressive conduct. The argument in favor of this
position does not rest on any distinctive First Amendment doctrine, but follows from the standard common (and Roman) law
86. See Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P. 2d 441, 447 (Cal. 1963).
87. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MODERN PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW (1980) (detailing the
expansion in design and warning cases).
88. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1964); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960). The rejection of all
waivers and disclaimers is institutionalized in RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS
§ 18 (AM. LAW INST. 1998).
89. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
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view that certain forms of harm must be regarded as damnum
absque injuria, literally harm (damnum) without legal injury (absque injuria). This doctrine is indispensable for development of
a coherent legal system. To argue that government should intervene in any case of harm means virtually all human conduct
becomes actionable, including blocking views by constructing
new buildings and refusing to deal in competitive markets.
The underlying rationale for the rigorous application of this
principle is that the private loss of the plaintiff is inversely related to overall social welfare, so that individual claims must be
rejected categorically, lest legal action systematically shut
down productive activity. The view here is not based on some
narrow sense of “individualism”—an evocative word that has
all-too-often been used to condemn laissez-faire economics.90
But similar logic applies here. To protect individuals against
mere offensive conduct is to invite people to merit that exalted
status by getting angrier and angrier, so that their private resentments give strong claims of rights against one another.
Everyone can play this game so that mutual indignation becomes the source of great anxiety or worse. The concept here is
not viewpoint sensitive, for it applies equally to the person
who is offended that the United States has gone to war and to
the person who is offended that the United States did not go to
war. One way to advance social peace is to deny any positive
return to heightened emotions intended to stir the flames. Offensive speech thus falls into a different category from
“fighting words” to a political opponent—an implicit threat of
force that is within the proper scope of government regulation.91
Fortunately, this prohibition has held firm. Thus in Matal v.
Tam,92 the Supreme Court held that the head of the Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) could not deny a trademark regulation to a San Francisco Asian band named “The Slants” on the
ground that its name contravened the Lanham Act provision
prohibiting the registration of trademarks that may disparage

90. Richard A. Epstein, Elizabeth Warren’s Sloppy Progressivism, DEFINING IDEAS
(Hoover Institution, D.C.) (Jan. 10, 2012), http://www.hoover.org/research/
elizabeth-warrens-sloppy-progressivism [https://perma.cc/L93S-XP5U].
91. See Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
92. 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).
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or bring into contempt any person living or dead.93 Justice
Alito, speaking for a unanimous Court held that “[s]peech that
demeans on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, age,
disability, or any other similar ground is hateful; but the
proudest boast of our free speech jurisprudence is that we protect the freedom to express ‘the thought that we hate.’”94
It is worth noting that Matal v. Tam involved not a direct
suppression of speech, but the refusal of the PTO to give The
Slants a more efficient route for trademark protection. Yet the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions rightly applies—given
that the state has a monopoly on licenses, it cannot use that
power to indirectly suppress speech it may not suppress directly. Thus, even if, as seems the case, Tam struck down the disparagement clause, there would still be a few instances in
which the PTO could refuse to issue a trademark to an offensive use of language that did not enjoy common law protection.
There is no reason why the PTO should have to give a mark,
already invalid under common law principles, the added benefits of registration, namely effective notice and presumptive
validity.
Indeed Tam is of exceptional importance because it reaffirms
the bottom-up view of intellectual property rights more generally. Registration does not create the right for a trademark any
more than it creates the right to acquire land. What it does,
consistent with Lockean theory, is to make these property
rights more secure, in the same way that the statute of frauds
and a land office regulation make the title property more secure, also by giving the notice to the world and conferring a
presumptive validity on the title. As Justice Alito argued, that
standardized protection under clear priority rules is worlds
apart from the massive government transfer programs funded
out of general tax revenues, which raise wholly different issues.95 The full set of constitutional doctrines thus works together in perfect harmony.

93. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2012).
94. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1764 (quoting United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644,
655 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
95. Id.
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Truthful Speech

The second notable set of free speech doctrines are those that
protect the ability of commercial parties to make truthful
statements about the services and goods that they sell. The only
justified area for government repression is false and misleading
speech, which again hearkens back to the standard common
law doctrine on misrepresentation. The point involves not only
ordinary services, but also, most critically, the dissemination of
information on matters of life and death, in connection with the
truthful promotion by drug companies of their products to either physicians or patients.96 The correct line in these cases follows the lead of Justice Clarence Thomas, who wrote, “I continue to believe that when the government seeks to restrict
truthful speech in order to suppress the ideas it conveys, strict
scrutiny is appropriate, whether or not the speech in question
may be characterized as ‘commercial.’”97
As a matter of first principle, it strains credulity that there is
any legitimate government justification for blocking the dissemination of truthful information that could aid in making
life-or-death decisions. And, in light of what was said in Tam,
the government gets no added regulatory power in FDA cases
by virtue of that fact that its license is needed to market the
drug. Once again the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions
limits the grounds on which the government, given its monopoly position, should be allowed to turn down applications. If it
cannot suppress speech by ordinary people when no license is
required, it cannot use its licensing power, given to protect
health and safety to block the dissemination truthful information about drugs from persons of full age and competence.
B.

Bad Speech Doctrine

I now turn to cases where the First Amendment law loses its
traction precisely because it does not conform with standard
common law principles: collective bargaining, antidiscrimination law, and force and fraud cases.
96. See, e.g., United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012); Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. United States FDA, 119 F. Supp. 3d 196 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (finding promotion of drug for off-label use protected).
97. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1769 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Lorillard Tobacco
Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 572 (2001)); see also, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode
Island, 517 U.S. 484, 518 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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Collective Bargaining

The first illustration comes from the limitations on freedom
of speech that are accepted in modern American labor law. As
already noted, the mandatory collective bargaining scheme
should on principle be rejected on the ground that employers
do not enjoy any monopoly power that justifies forcing on
them the duty to bargain under a theory rightly reserved to
common carriers and public utilities. But now that the objection
has been overrun, the question is whether traditional protections afforded to property and speech still have a role to play.
In both areas, the law has to bend to accommodate the new
basic premise.
Note the transition. In Kaiser Aetna v. United States,98 the Supreme Court announced categorically “that the ‘right to exclude,’ so universally held to be a fundamental element of the
property right, falls within this category of interests that the
Government cannot take without compensation.”99 But apparently not in labor cases. Thus, in Republic Aviation v. NLRB,100
the Supreme Court sided with the NLRB when it treated as an
unfair labor practice ”the rule against solicitation in so far as it
prohibits union activity and solicitation on company property
during the employees’ own time.”101 The word “trespass” did
not appear in this decision, yet that is precisely what happened.
Normally the common law rules on exclusive use are suspended in cases of necessity, as when entry takes place to prevent imminent death, serious bodily injury, or serious property
disruption.102 But that is not the case here. The union, of course,
is engaging in speech activities when it solicits workers for
membership, but it would be idle to claim that it was entitled
to protection for its activities on any ground of freedom of
speech on the premise that the state is involved if the owner
seeks its assistance in expelling the intruders. The protection of
this common law right is not a form of state action, let alone, as
98. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
99. Id. at 179–80.
100. 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
101. Id. at 796.
102. See, e.g., Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 124 N.W. 221, 222 (Minn. 1910)
(allowing the privilege, but requiring compensation for property loss); Ploof v.
Putnam, 71 A. 188, 189–90 (Vt. 1908) (allowing the privilege without compensation).
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Tam notes, a state subsidy.103 Free speech again must be understood within a comprehensive framework of general property
rights. One can no more trespass to gain access to speak than to
gain access to farm equipment. But once the duty to bargain is
imposed, it makes no sense to continue to allow the traditional
right to exclude. Then the employer could first agree to a deal
and then exercise its right to exclude workers from its plants.
The change in one basic rule of freedom of association requires a similar change in the rules on freedom of speech. In
ordinary discourse, each side can say what it wants to advance
its position so long as it does not engage in the threat of force
or the commission of fraud. Hence, it is perfectly permissible at
common law to threaten the performance of a lawful action,
namely the refusal to deal. So, a statement that I shall move my
business, introduce machines, or fire you all is part of the way
in which the parties determine whether to deal or not, and if to
deal, on what terms. But once the labor law is put into place,
the right to walk away disappears. So now any threat to move
a business or close down a section should be understood as the
threat to commit an unlawful act that the state can then bar.104
At this point, the hard question is just what can an employer
state that would not be construed as an implied threat. One
reading is nothing at all. The most it can do is exercise its right
under the NLRA not to make a specific concession in the
course of bargaining,105 which has the unpleasant consequence
of leaving the union in the dark as to the employer’s reservation price on critical terms. The Taft-Hartley reform, Section
8(c), seeks to provide the appropriate roadmap when it says:
The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the
dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic,
or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this subchapter, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or
force or promise of benefit.106

The last phrase, dealing with a threat of reprisal or force or
promise of benefit makes the fatal linkage. Threats of force
103. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1760–61 (2017).
104. See, e.g., Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263
(1965).
105. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2012).
106. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2012).
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should always be off the table, but the term “reprisal” is clearly
meant to go beyond that state of affairs, to cover other kinds of
actions that make it more difficult for unions to organize. And
the promise of a benefit, that is, a statement of what the employer will do if the workers choose not to join the union, is
banned to make sure that the employer is not allowed to undercut the collective bargaining system by competing for the
loyalty of workers by offering them a better deal—including
terms that allow the firm and the worker to divide the productivity gains by blocking any union that seeks to organize the
workers from gaining a cut of the deal. The situation is further
compounded by the insistence of dissident union members that
they have a free speech right not to pay dues to a union whose
mission they do not support,107 which is then met by the converse claim that the union is entitled to recoup from the state
under a takings theory the lost dues that come from the state
adoption of a right-to-work rule that in its view allows dissident workers to free-ride on union efforts.108
My point here is not to resolve this jumble of confusions, but
only to point out yet again that none of these issues arise under
a common law framework. The employer can decide to refuse
to deal with workers, and can enter into yellow-dog contracts
to secure loyalty from those to whom he extends offers. The
union can only include in its ranks the members it can lawfully
recruit into the organization. So there the standard theories of
speech and association obviate all the second-best adjustments
that need to be made, fitfully at best, in these cases. Once again,
the unified theory beats the ad hoc approach as a matter of
common, statutory and constitutional law.
2.

Antidiscrimination Law

In one sense, the employment discrimination laws of the
1960s are a second generation attack on freedom of contract in
competitive markets. As was the case with collective bargaining, the introduction of the new system necessarily places large
107. See, e.g., Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014).
108. See Sweeney v. Pence, 767 F.3d 654, 671 (7th Cir. 2014) (Wood, C.J., dissenting); Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Wisconsin, No. 2015CV000628, 2016 Wisc. Cir.
LEXIS 1, at *6 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Apr. 8, 2016). For my critique, see Richard A. Epstein,
The Misconceived Attack on Right to Work Law, 2017 U. CHI. LEGAL FORUM (forthcoming 2017).
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and unprincipled limitations on freedom of association. Some
of these limitations are of lesser practical consequence because
they tend to match the private preferences of the firms subject
to their scope: there are many more firms that support diversity
and affirmative action than want to exclude minorities from
their ranks—by orders of magnitude.109 But it is important to
understand which way dual preferences, public and private,
should be reconciled. Rightly understood, they are reason to
remove state compulsion, since markets already echo the dominant sentiment. And that case for getting rid of these laws in
the absence of monopoly power (which is never found in labor
markets) is stronger because there are serious dangers that
government will apply these antidiscrimination laws (or human rights laws as they are often called) to small groups that
have their own reasons for bucking the dominant trend. The
issue of divergent preferences arises not only in employment
contexts but also with charitable and religious organizations
that have consistent sets of beliefs out of step with the world at
large.
As noted earlier, the correct common law view on this subject only uses the antidiscrimination norm as a counterweight
to monopoly power, so that it has no proper application to any
business or social organization operating in a competitive environment. That argument applies equally to all forms of discrimination on the grounds of race, sex, sexual orientation, or
age. Remove these particular rules and we should expect to see
some private organizations depart from any X-blind rules, including diversity or affirmative action programs that have attracted widespread social support today under the banner of
“inclusion and diversity.” The great virtue of a competitive
market is that different organizations can experiment with different programs, allowing for a higher level of social satisfaction precisely because all organizations do not toe the same
line.
It is of course clear that in modern social discourse the antidiscrimination norm has emerged triumphant against all rival
109. Jonathan D. Glater, Affirmative Action: A Corporate Diary, N.Y. TIMES (June 29,
2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/06/29/business/affirmative-action-a-corporatediary.html [https://perma.cc/4FMB-9ZYC]; Roger Parloff, Big Business Asks Supreme
Court to Save Affirmative Action, FORTUNE (Dec. 9, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/
12/09/supreme-court-affirmative-action/ [https://perma.cc/G9J4-NZZF].
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claims of economic liberty, with of course a huge exception
from the so-called color-blind or sex-blind rules for given protected classes. But the First Amendment is made of sterner
stuff. Under its two-tier system of constitutional rights, it calls
for a higher level of scrutiny of government actions. But here
again the confused state of the basic norm destabilizes the system, so that the antidiscrimination norm often trumps associational freedom when monopoly is nowhere in sight. One early
case for this position was Roberts v. United States Jaycees,110
where the Court, with an opinion from Justice Brennan, sustained an order under the Minnesota Human Rights Law for
the Jaycees to admit women as equal voting members in the
organization. In his view, the freedom of association only came
out ahead in certain kinds of “intimate human relationships,”
of which membership in a large organization was not one.111
Brennan’s carefully crafted exception was clearly motivated by
the desire to prevent the state from making it illegal for people
to turn down marriage partners for reason of race and religion.
In those cases, the freedom of association is at its strongest.
But why does the right vanish when the organization gets larger? Socially, everyone understands the difference, which is why
marriage and social organizations operate under different
rules, even in the absence of the antidiscrimination norm. The
Jaycees will be subject to much social pressure to change their
rules, and if they refuse to buckle, other organizations will expand or form to take up the slack. Given these powerful forces
it is risky business for the government to decide whom any
group must admit and whom it may exclude. Public agencies
have little knowledge of the internal dynamics of discrete private organizations that justifies putting them in a position to
dictate values on group membership or rules of internal organization. Groups that go too far out of line with social practices
will find it hard to attract new members or trading partners.
Predictably, Roberts raised unwelcome complications with
the decision in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,112 where a bitterly
divided Court took the opposite view and allowed the Boy
Scouts to refuse to make Dale a troop leader solely because he
110. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
111. Id. at 617–18.
112. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
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was gay. The case thus drew the opposite balance as Roberts for
this large-scale organization, in part because of its religious
overtones. That decision provoked a sharp dissent from Justice
Stevens who insisted that the only organizations that should be
entitled to First Amendment protection against antidiscrimination laws are those that have deep commitments to their extreme substantive views, which the Scouts could not claim because of internal inconsistency on gay rights.113 But Justice
Stevens’s view (like the rules on offensive speech) only
strengthens the hand of extremists in every organization. The
voice of moderates should count equally.114 In fact, in the aftermath of Dale, extended internal deliberations ultimately resulted in a shift of policy, all the more legitimate precisely because it was achieved internally.115
The greatest controversy comes from recent cases in which
small businesses have been subject to the full brunt of the law
in connection with their refusal to make wedding cakes,116 take
photographs,117 or supply flowers for same-sex marriages.118
These proprietors have uniformly claimed that they cannot enter into activities that violate their personal and deeply-held
religious beliefs, for which they have received a storm of abuse
from government officials on the ground that those individuals
who don’t want to play by the human rights laws are bigots
who should be shut down.119 The question is whether there is
113. Id. at 675 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
114. For my views, see Richard A. Epstein, The Constitutional Perils of Moderation:
The Case of the Boy Scouts, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 119 (2000).
115. David Crary & Brady McCombs, Boy Scouts faring well a year after easing ban
on gay adults, ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 23, 2016), https://apnews.com/
3de59dad2ba74b8f98bd3bc9b93c9bfc/boy-scouts-faring-well-year-after-easingban-gay-adults [https://perma.cc/L9L9-M8BV].
116. Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272 (Colo. Ct. App. 2015),
cert. denied, No. 15SC738, 2016 WL 1645027 (Colo. Apr. 25, 2016), cert. granted sub
nom. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 137 S. Ct. 2290
(2017).
117. Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013).
118. State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543 (Wash. 2017).
119. See, e.g., U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE: RECONCILING NONDISCRIMINATION PRINCIPLES WITH CIVIL LIBERTIES (2016), http://www.
usccr.gov/pubs/Peaceful-Coexistence-09-07-16.PDF [https://perma.cc/R6GY-PQ5P].
The report contains a separate statement by five of the commissioners—Chairman
Martin Castro, joined by Commissioners Roberta Achtenberg, David Kladney,
Karen Narasaki, and Michael Yaki—who write: “These laws”—which seek exceptions to the antidiscrimination laws—”represent an orchestrated, nationwide ef-
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any pushback to these intemperate statements. One line of defense is that taking pictures, baking cakes, and arranging flowers are forms of expressive activity. A second is that the defendants do not discriminate on grounds of sexual orientation,
but only on their views of proper marital status.120 The first argument pushes the expression-conduct line so that much can
be made conduct. The second is hard to sustain given the high,
but by no means complete, correlation between the two positions: these same bakers will not make cakes for polygamous
marriages either.121
Within the current framework, both First Amendment arguments have been blown away by courts that treat human rights
laws as embodying a compelling state interest. Thus it is said
that: ”Antidiscrimination laws have important purposes that
go beyond expressing government values: they ensure that
services are freely available in the market, and they protect individuals from humiliation and dignitary harm.”122 Or further,
that “[t]he reality is that because it is a public accommodation,
its provision of services can be regulated, even though those
services include artistic and creative work.”123 Or finally: “At
first blush, it may seem reasonable that a private business
should be able to refuse service to anyone it chooses. This view,
however, fails to take into account the cost to society and the
hurt caused to persons who are denied service simply because
of who they are.”124 The explicit strategy is to reduce these casfort by extremists to promote bigotry, cloaked in the mantle of ‘religious freedom.’” Id. at 160.
120. See, e.g., Arlene’s Flowers, 389 P.3d at 553.
121. This rationale motived Justice Ginsburg in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 689 (2010) (“Our decisions have declined to distinguish between status and conduct in this context.”). Indeed, just this point surfaced in the
recent Supreme Court decision in Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012
(2017) (striking down a Missouri constitutional provision forbidding any cash
contribution to religious organizations and insisting on a distinction between
status and conduct). That distinction was rejected by Justice Gorsuch, who would
have extended the First Amendment protection further, id. at 2025 (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring), and by Justice Sotomayor, who thought that the protection went too
far and would have allowed some states to impose the prohibition even if others
did not, id. at 2027 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
122. Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 64.
123. Id. at 66.
124. Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., Colorado Civil Rights Commission
CR 2013-0008, at 4 (2013). The United States Supreme Court later granted certiorari on the question of “Whether applying Colorado’s public accommodations law
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es to issues of economic liberty where the state’s power is
thought to be greater.
Yet the common law framework does not yield to these facile
arguments. These statutes do nothing to ensure that various
services are available in the market. The parties who claim protection as a matter of freedom of religion or of association possess no power to prevent a huge industry from serving groups
that a few isolated, small merchants refuse to serve, and then
only for the religious ceremonies. That market is quite robust,
even if 100% of the firms do not serve it. But even worse, the
claims for legal protection are driven by an exaggerated sense
of dignitary harms of the very sort that were emphatically rejected in Matal v. Tam.
More generally, any claim of dignitary harm has to be rightly
resisted, lest any refusal to deal on any ground not covered by
the Washington human rights law could count as a dignitary
harm, including customer decisions not to patronize religious
organizations because they find their beliefs offensive. And it is
easy to embroider these claims. For example, the private complainants, who had patronized Arlene’s Flowers for years,
claimed that they lost their appetite for a large wedding once
they were rebuffed for fear that other proprietors would follow, even after Barronelle Stutzman, Arlene’s proprietor, provided the names of nearby shops that would take their business, while other merchants, following their Facebook feed,
supplied the couple free services.125 It is easy to embellish the
level of emotional anguish by claiming that they were “feeling
very hurt and upset emotionally,” and “so deeply offended
that apparently our business is no longer good business,” because “[his] loved one [did not fit] within [the vendor’s] personal beliefs.”126 Note how the religious element drops out of
the description of the case.

to compel the petitioner to create expression that violates his sincerely held religious beliefs about marriage violates the free speech or free exercise clauses of the
First Amendment.” Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/masterpiece-cakeshop-ltdv-colorado-civil-rights-commn/ [https://perma.cc/S2TR-UU4A] (last visited Sept.
25, 2017).
125. Arlene’s Flowers, 389 P.3d 543, 549.
126. Id.
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The simple way to understand the exaggerated nature of these customer complaints is to ask about the tradeoffs demanded.
The religious organizations only ask that people, for a limited
subset of services, go down the block to another business that
is happy to serve them. The human rights proponents ask people to give up their religious beliefs or go out of business entirely. They care not about the emotional anguish that those
threats cause. Nor are these proponents much moved when
these small proprietors are subject to multiple threats and unkind messages. To make matters worse, the human rights law
compounds the risk of set-up. A gay couple that has no desire
to have their wedding services provided by fundamentalist
Christian groups may put in a diplomatic request, and when
politely referred somewhere else, turn the matter over to a civil
rights commission that finishes the job by initiating full scale
prosecution, complete with demands for reeducation of offenders in good Maoist style.127
There is a lesson to be learned here. There is little that the
First Amendment will do to protect people once the antidiscrimination laws are held to be a compelling state interest even
in fully competitive markets. It is no pleasure to see the full
brunt of the law brought against small businesses. There was
once a time when the purpose of constitutional guarantees of
individual rights was to protect, in the famous words of Footnote 4 of United States v. Carolene Products,128 “discrete and insular minorities” against oppression by government actors.129 It
was that spirit that led to the decision in NAACP v. Alabama,130
where associational freedoms were protected against state demands for the disclosure of membership lists that could expose
their members to just this form of abuse. But now that the gay
rights movement is ascendant, small evangelical Christians can
be forced to choose between abandoning their religious beliefs
or their business. The lesson here is that vulnerable individuals
and groups cannot be protected against a legal onslaught once
127. See Steven F. Hayward, Persecution and The Art of Baking, Or How Civil
Rights Became Corrupt, FORBES (June 30, 2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
stevenhayward/2014/06/30/persecution-and-the-art-of-baking-or-how-civil-rightsbecame-corrupt/ [https://perma.cc/JY5F-4KSL].
128. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
129. Id. at 152 n.4.
130. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
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economic liberties fail. Economic liberties and political liberties
stand together or fall together. The antidiscrimination laws are
now used to steamroll associational freedoms where it matters
most—on matters of religious belief and conviction.
3.

Force

The next set of cases that I wish to examine involves the relationship of First Amendment protections to private conduct
that involves the use of force. Commonly, there are legitimate
grounds for the restriction or suppression of force as well as
fraud, and genuine uncertainty as to how that goal should best
be accomplished. One of the areas which gives rise to the
greatest tension is picketing around some controversial site.
Traditionally that tension arose in connection with labor disputes, where it has always proved difficult to tease out the
threat of force on the one side of the equation from the effort to
persuade on the other. At times, these decisions have been
based on common law principles,131 and at other times on the
First Amendment.132
As should be apparent, there is in principle no reason to expect or accept any systematic divergence between the two approaches, since they both share a common objective of sorting
the wheat from the chaff. The evident difficulty is that courts
struggle to come up with some general rule that works across
all cases. But by the same token, allowing endless variation in
defining the scope of an injunction invites excessive levels of
judicial discretion in individual cases. Unfortunately, modern
First Amendment law often takes the wrong approach on both
liability and remedies.
In Snyder v. Philips,133 members of the Westboro Church picketed near the funeral site of a Marine Lance Corporal who was
killed while serving in Iraq. The signs at some distance from
the funeral promised to wreak vengeance on all those who
were in the U.S. military.134 But the picketing took place some
1000 feet from the funeral site and could not be seen or heard
131. See, for illustrations of the problem, Vegalahn v. Gunter, 44 N.E. 1077 (Mass.
1896) (finding picketing illegal, over a passionate Holmes dissent).
132. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
133. 562 U.S. 443 (2011).
134. Id. at 448.
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or heard during the ceremonies.135 The plaintiffs only learned
about the activities after the services were over.136 They brought
five different common law causes of action: defamation, publicity given to private life, intentional infliction of emotional distress, intrusion upon seclusion, and civil conspiracy.137 There is
little reason to go into these in great detail, but essentially each
of them would fall short under standard tort law. The most obvious candidate would be intentional infliction of emotional
distress. But so long as there is no direct interaction between
the defendant and plaintiff that claim would fail, for the supposed impact is no greater than if the demonstration were done
100 miles away.138 Short of interference with the ceremony, the
case is at an end.
Accordingly, the jury verdict of $2.9 million for intentional
infliction of emotional distress and intrusion on seclusion goes
way beyond the traditional limits of that tort. I am not aware of
any tort case in which an adverse reaction to mean and nasty
words or gestures is actionable in the absence of some direct
connection. Perhaps one should be able to argue for a reversal
of that rule, but remove the physical connection and the scope
of liability becomes virtually unlimited. Either way, that too is
a federal constitutional issue for the same reason that the contours of the tort of defamation was a constitutional issue in
New York Times v. Sullivan. Freedom of speech begins where the
tort law ends, so that interdependence between the two is total.
The Supreme Court in New York Times v. Sullivan did not examine the soundness of the state law judgment by asking
whether it violated any norms against force and fraud. Instead,
it assumed that state law had final say on the tort law, so that
the First Amendment only came into play after the tort decision
was settled.139 That approach represents one of the occupational hazards of insisting that tort and constitutional law fall into
separate compartments. But in Snyder v. Phelps, the shift in approach leads to the wrong place, by asking whether the speech
was a matter of public interest and concern that rated a higher
level of constitutional protection than matters of merely private
135. Id. at 449.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 450.
138. See, e.g., Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 815 (Cal. 1989).
139. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 267–68 (1964).
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level of concern. But in this context why worry about this distinction at all? If there had been some direct abusive conduct, I
am hard pressed to think that the conduct should be protected
from tort liability because the abuse related to the war in Iraq
as opposed to the decedent’s bad posture. The content makes
no difference here, for any matter of public concern can be
raised, as it was done in this case out of eyeshot and earshot of
the plaintiff. There is no reason for some distinctive constitutional overlay. The difficulties at the borderland of the tort theory are not resolved by invoking some supposed constitutional
norm that itself faces the same degree of difficulty. Once again,
the common law rules are an accurate guide to constitutional
law, in difficult as well as easy cases.
The issue of picketing surfaced yet again in McCullen v. Coakley,140 which involved a Massachusetts statute that imposed a
thirty-five-foot buffer zone around abortion clinics targeted
solely at picketers.141 A statute of this sort would be wholly out
of line if there were no explicit or implicit threat to people entering the clinic. But there was a legislative record that documented frequent occasions in which persons who claimed to be
giving compassionate advice were perceived by women in an
obviously vulnerable position as making unwelcome advances
that crossed over from persuasion to coercion.142 Women who
have scheduled an appointment at an abortion clinic are not
the most likely targets for advice that they switch course at the
last moment.
The question is how to sort out these messy situations, and
common law courts are by necessity left with the need to work
out individual injunctions in ad hoc decisions that could produce different outcomes from case to case. The legislative solution was intended to remove this uncertainty by picking a distance that allowed picketers to get close enough to have their
signs read and their messages heard, but not so close as to
reach out and touch people seeking to enter the clinic, which
for these purposes is a guaranteed constitutional right no mat140. 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014).
141. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 266 § 120E1/2(b) (2012) (“No person shall knowingly
enter or remain on a public way or sidewalk adjacent to a reproductive health care
facility within a radius of 35 feet of any portion of an entrance, exit or driveway of
a reproductive health care facility . . . .”).
142. McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2535.
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ter what one thinks of the constitutional soundness of Roe v.
Wade.143 It looks as though this statute makes an appropriate
accommodation for the relevant interests. I would vote for the
statute if a member of the state legislature.
It is therefore instructive to see how current constitutional jurisprudence skews the analysis in ways that led to striking the
law down. One class of First Amendment cases involves the
application of content-neutral rules that impose time, place,
and manner restrictions that do not, and are not, intended to
switch the balance of advantage between rival positions.144
These in general receive more deference than content-specific
statutes which generally require higher scrutiny because of
their greater ability to tip the scales in one direction or another
in any substantive debate.145
In practice, however, both these presumptions are much too
rigid. In McCullen, Chief Justice Roberts took the view that the
Massachusetts law imposed a content-neutral restriction, which
he then struck down because he thought that historically the
ability of the state to regulate protests on public streets was
“very limited.”146 There is no doubt that this judgment makes
sense in most cases. But it does not obviously apply at a choke
point at the access to private property where threats are far
higher. So, in this case, the basic presumption is overcome, as
the right of ingress and egress should dominate.
Justice Roberts’s position is in my view subject to a strong
objection that the Massachusetts law is a content-based decision, given that it is known that the only protestors that will
camp outside reproductive health care facilities are abortion
protestors. But once again it does not follow that the Massachusetts statute should fall because it is content-based, as Justice Scalia protested,147 in light of the good reasons for imposing that restriction. It would be wildly inappropriate to impose
these same limitations in front of those businesses that face no
picketing threats. To rely on the content-based distinction
143. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
144. See, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
145. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 724 (2012).
146. 134 S. Ct. at 2522 (quoting United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983)).
For the origin of the doctrine, see Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization,
307 U.S. 496, 515–16 (1939).
147. 134 S. Ct. at 2548 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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misses the central point. This uniform statutory rule is meant to
supply a wholesale substitute to case-by-case injunctions. In
practice, those injunctions would necessarily be confined to
abortion clinics, so any statute that went beyond the area of
controversy would necessarily be overbroad. Using contentbased distinctions as a targeted response to a content-based
problem is wholly appropriate. The Massachusetts statute did a
good job of minimizing uncertainty in its administration by
setting a distance that balanced the competing interests. It deserved to pass constitutional muster.
4.

Fraud

A parallel afflicts the dominant Supreme Court approach in
cases of fraud. Initially, the First Amendment adds nothing to
the proper definition of fraud. There are many cases, especially
under the securities law, where it is always an open question of
how to draw the line between statements of fact and statements
of opinion, or to determine potential liability for concealment
or nondisclosure, or to address the issue of causation in fraud
cases. A quick aside, all the common law issues surface in parallel form with fraud actions under the securities law, and once
again the same arguments that have traction in the common
law context tend to be those that work best at the statutory level.148 The correct approach is to first determine the scope of
fraud, and then to make sure that the government is not allowed to force into the fraud category truthful statements that
do not belong there. It is just this sound procedure that is followed in cases that make “false and misleading” statements the
touchstone for liability. To be sure, in some cases, fraud
morphs into misrepresentation under either a negligence or

148. See, e.g., Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Indus. Pension
Fund, 135 S. Ct. 1318, 1330 (2015). Omnicare relied in part on the common law
decision in Smith v. Land and House Property Corp. (1884) 28 Ch D 7 (C.A.) 15
(Eng.), which showed a better grasp of the overall situation, by placing the correct
emphasis on asymmetrical information. Thus, in that case the owner of a set of
flats knew that his tenant had problems making rental payments, but nonetheless
falsely described him as a desirable tenant. But in Omnicare the prospect of further
government regulation was surely known to both sides in a sophisticated transaction, so that the claim for a false statement of fact was far weaker. The case should
not have been remanded for a full trial. There should have been a summary
judgment for the defendant.
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strict liability standard,149 but even then, the element of falsehood remains. But, as in McCullen, it is critical to understand
the interplay between public and private remedies.
One case that illustrates these current doctrinal pitfalls is
United States v. Alvarez,150 which arose out of a criminal prosecution under the Stolen Valor Act, the key provision of which
provided:
(b) FALSE CLAIMS ABOUT RECEIPT OF MILITARY DECORATIONS OR MEDALS. — Whoever falsely represents
himself or herself, verbally or in writing, to have been
awarded any decoration or medal authorized by Congress
for the Armed Forces of the United States . . . shall be fined
under this title, imprisoned not more than six months, or
both.151

The statute then imposed enhanced penalties for claiming to
be a recipient of the Congressional Medal of Honor—this nation’s highest military award.152 The statute as drafted contained no scienter requirement, but as a matter of good sense,
the government was prepared to prove scienter in its prosecution of Alvarez who had stated falsely on multiple occasions,
“I’m a retired marine of 25 years. I retired in the year 2001.
Back in 1987, I was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor. I got wounded many times by the same guy.”153
In striking down this statute Justice Kennedy did not start
with the notion that common law fraud is generally actionable,
but begun instead with First Amendment doctrine that subjects
content-based restrictions on speech to a high level of scrutiny
and not some “free-floating test” that purports to weigh the
relative costs and benefits in each case.154 Instead, he notes that
this balancing approach applies to various cases involving defamation, threats of imminent lawless action, and fighting
words.155
Critically, he does not apply the same logic to ordinary common fraud, even if that is punished time and again under the
149. See supra text accompanying notes 29–30.
150. 567 U.S. 709 (2012).
151. 18 U.S.C. § 704(b) (2012).
152. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 724.
153. Id. at 714.
154. Id. at 717 (quoting United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010)).
155. Id.
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securities law, or laws dealing with false claims for medical reimbursement, resume fraud in job applications, the unfair trade
practices law, and the like. In these areas, the rationale for the
strong prohibition against fraud is that feeding people false information can lead them to make bad decisions of a business or
social nature—decisions that they would not have made had
they known the truth. Justice Kennedy then argues that the
government had not established any actual link between the
false statements and harm to anyone else, and did not show
that counter speech would not be sufficient to handle the situation, given that the false nature of his speech was readily apparent to most people.156
In contrast, the concurrence of Justice Breyer stresses that in
some cases, lies are justified to keep away prying eyes, or to
help patients who are ill.157 But there is of course no shred of
any independent justification offered in this case. Nor does this
case involve those tricky mixes of fact and opinion, which
should generally be given a wide berth. Unlike Justice Kennedy, Justice Breyer thinks that a more “finely tailored” statute
might survive scrutiny, without telling us how that revised law
might look.158 But none of this deflects the single most obvious
point that Alvarez engages in the worst kind of lying for private gain and the expense of others. Only Justice Alito’s dissent
made the sensible point that these frauds had occurred pervasively with literally hundreds of people making these false
claims in a year, with little repercussion.159 Striking down the
statute knocks out the ability to control these cases where the
frauds may themselves work serious harms.
So, the real question is how should a common law lawyer
look at this issue, and the answer is—as in the abortion picketing situation in McCullen—that it is always appropriate for legislatures to enact state remedies when private rights of action
turn out to be inadequate. The same is true with the securities
laws concerned about fraud on the market precisely because it
is so difficult to prove reliance in individual cases.160 The situation here gives rise to the usual collective action problem,
156. Id. at 726–27.
157. Id. at 733 (Breyer, J., concurring).
158. Id. at 737.
159. Id. at 741–42 (Alito, J., dissenting).
160. See, e.g., Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232 (1988).
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where no single potential target will sue over false speech that
harms large numbers of unrelated persons. The statute thus
sensibly dispenses with proof of specific causation in the individual case, and imposes injunctive relief or criminal sanctions
to counteract the virtual certainty that some unidentified, and
perhaps unidentifiable, individual has been hurt. Socially, improved deterrence can be achieved even if the particular victims cannot be isolated. That happens with standard consumer
fraud statutes that follow exactly this position. So why then
deviate from these rules just because the particular victim is
not found? The common law rules on fraud are perfectly general, they apply to all material false statements of fact, and
there are no special rules carved out for certain types of
speech.161 If a statement is a lie, it should be punished and the
claim that the First Amendment prohibits various contentbased statements makes no sense in light of the underlying
risks. Alvarez so waffles on remedial issues that it necessarily
erodes, for no good social purpose, the institutional protection
against fraud. The common law position offers a far firmer
foundation for this statutory prohibition.
The same difficulties in determining the appropriate boundaries of the First Amendment also arise in the commercial context, most notably in the recent decision in Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman.162 That case involved New York General
Business Law § 518, which provides that "[n]o seller in any
sales transaction may impose a surcharge on a holder who
elects to use a credit card in lieu of payment by cash, check, or
similar means.”163 The purpose of this statute was to protect
credit card companies whenever merchants wished to impose a
higher charge for the use of a credit than for payment in cash or
by check. In effect, the merchants could keep the identical price
differential by offering a discount to the customers who paid
by cash or by check. In pure economic terms, the dollar figures
are the same if the credit card transaction costs $102 and the
cash or check transaction costs $100. But it does not take a behavioral economist to recognize that the percentage of credit
card transactions would likely fall if the language of penalty
161. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
162. 137 S. Ct. 1144 (2017).
163. Id. at 1147.
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and surcharge were used. This is why the credit card companies supported the statute which blocked the use of terms like
“surcharge.”
The Supreme Court found that the regulation was directed
toward speech, overruling the Second Circuit which had found
that it regulated conduct. Because the Second Circuit spoke
about the mode of communication, and not the information
communicated, the case was remanded for further review to
determine whether it “survived First Amendment scrutiny.”164
There remained the contested issue of whether the New York
law was a valid commercial speech regulation under Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Service Commission of New
York,165 or a valid disclosure requirement under Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio.166 It is a sure
tipoff of intellectual disarray to leave a case hanging on these
familiar, but elusive, modes of analysis.
This confusion stems from the fact that the dispute in this
case revolved around the wrong question, namely, whether the
New York statute regulated conduct or expression. This
distinction must be drawn under current law because the law
subjects speech regulation to higher levels of scrutiny than
economic regulation. But the hard question is why the law
should treat speech and conduct differently in the first place.
From a classical liberal perspective, the choice of pricing
mechanisms can be left to the banks and merchants to decide
by contract, and presumably they will come up with some
formula that will allow them to reach the right solution on both
relevant points: the rate of interest and the mode of its
presentation.
The correct approach disregards the line between conduct
and speech. If the state can regulate the interest rates that
private parties can charge in competitive markets, then it can
regulate the mode of their communication. If it cannot regulate
the first, then it cannot regulate the second. Ideally, both forms
of regulation should be struck down in competitive markets, so
that the balancing rituals can be safely put to one side in favor
of a unified theory of the sort advocated in this article.
164. Id. at 1151.
165. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
166. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
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CONCLUSION

The purpose of this article is to propose that the Supreme
Court rethink the way in which it organizes its inquiry into free
speech cases. Right now, the general approach is to treat the
First Amendment inquiry as deriving from a set of tests that
are said to follow from the constitutional text. Thus, the Court
places too much reliance on its uncritical defense of the usual
distinctions between speech and conduct, between contentspecific and content-neutral speech, between low-valued and
high-valued speech, and between political and commercial
speech. Its approach gives rise to an entire set of constitutional
presumptions that work their way through its entire docket.
I do not regard the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence
to be the same type of intellectual shipwreck that characterizes
its treatment of the takings cases,167 where the constitutional
analysis of private property is wholly unrecognizable to anyone who cares or knows its basic structure, as it has been derived through the ages. The key difference between these two
areas is that the rational basis test, which dominates the takings
law, does not drive First Amendment analysis. Higher levels of
judicial scrutiny are almost always positively correlated with
higher levels of intellectual acumen. Nonetheless, the complete
separation between freedom of speech and economic liberties is
not possible, for example, in the context of labor laws, so that
there is always some uncertainty as to which level of scrutiny
applies.
As I demonstrate in this paper, a different set of results
comes from thinking of the constitution as resting on common
law substantive doctrine, which announces protection for freedom of speech, and then uses standard interpretive techniques
to ask how that freedom relates to the control of force, fraud,
and monopoly practices. In this situation, one key question is
often whether particular speech is false or misleading, and if it
is, whether it is properly subject to well-crafted regulation. A
167. Of which the latest illustration is Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in
Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017), which manages to mangle the law of
regulatory takings because of its resolute refusal to return to first principles working through the field. For a critique of the subject, see Richard A. Epstein, Disappointed Expectations: How the Supreme Court Failed to Clean Up Takings Law in Murr
v. Wisconsin, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 151 (2017).

No. 1]

Common Law for the First Amendment

47

second question is whether certain forms of speech amount to
the use or threat of force. In both these cases, government regulation is permissible and the great challenge is how to organize
the relationship between public and private remedies when it
is uncertain whether the effort to suppress fraud will also suppress proper speech.
The first of these inquiries, dealing with entitlements, tends
to be conceptual and in this context one great judicial achievement is the insistence that mere offense by others to words
spoken is never a sufficient justification for shutting them
down. It is critical not to let these self-induced emotional and
dignitary losses drive the shape of the law. Yet because freedom of speech is put into one silo and the antidiscrimination
laws into another, the same kind of emotional-reaction refusalto-deal cases based, for example, on same-sex marriages, is
treated as a grave offense that justifies massive government
intervention, which leads to a totalitarian overreach directed
against a weak and isolated minority that also should enjoy
speech and associational freedoms. A similar progressive mistake arises under Section 8(c) of Taft-Hartley, which statute’s
unacceptable restrictions on employer speech are justified only
as a back up to the progressive system of mandatory collective
bargaining, which is itself economically unwise and constitutionally suspect. These two doctrinal innovations stand together, and, more importantly, should fall together, for the effort to
control employer speech has nothing to do with the control of
force, fraud, or monopoly.
In other cases, however, the insistence of starting fresh in
First Amendment cases tends to lead to an overexpansion of
speech protection relative to a sensible common law norm.
That arises with the casual attitude to fraud in cases like Alvarez, and to the threat of force in McCullen, leading to the serious
under-enforcement of fundamental libertarian norms. The
common law rules on the exercise of sound discretion call for
courts and legislatures alike to minimize the risks of over- and
under-enforcement, considering the risks of case-by-case discretion in setting legal remedies.
In the end, the doctrinal and administrative errors made by
seeking to forge a distinctively constitutional culture for each
provision results in excessive restriction of speech in some cases, and insufficient regulation of speech in others. Unfortunate-
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ly, the two sets of errors do not cancel out. They cumulate. A
fundamental call to a consistent common law approach to all
areas will have two desirable consequences: first, it will allow
for a more coherent exposition and development of the law
governing freedom of speech, and second, it will allow for the
development of a more integrated doctrinal approach across
different constitutional areas, which in fact are linked together
by the classical liberal principles that animate the constitution
and offer the only foundation for constitutional adjudication.

